The Effect of Vertical and Horizontal Trust on

Voluntary Tax Compliance

(An Experimental Study) by Narsa, I Made et al.
The Effect of Vertical and Horizontal Trust on 
Voluntary Tax Compliance 
(An Experimental Study) 
Ivonne Helena Putong 
Universitas Airlangga  
Surabaya, Indonesia 
Politeknik Negeri Manado 
Manado, Indonesia 
ivonnehelen@yahoo.com  
Arsono Laksmana 
Universitas Airlangga  
Surabaya, Indonesia 
I Made Narsa 
Universitas Airlangga 
Surabaya, Indonesia 
Abstract—Every country, with a voluntary tax collection system, 
should consider the potential tax evasion. The economics of crime 
approach which is expected to increase tax compliance is still 
constrained by considerable amount of administrative costs. 
Trust-based regulation can reduce the social costs for taxpayers 
and tax authorities. This study examines the effect of the trust of 
taxpayers to the tax authority and other taxpayers on voluntary 
tax compliance in laboratory experiments. The subject of this 
study is MSMEs business people who have already got Tax ID 
Number (TIN). Factorial design used is 2 x 2 using tools such as 
booklets, videos and storyboards. The results of this study 
provide empirical evidence that supports the main effect of 
vertical trust and horizontal trust on tax compliance. Hypothesis 
3 predicts the effect of the interaction between the trust to tax 
authority and the trust to other taxpayers on the amount of 
income reported. However, the results of the analysis show no 
interaction, which means that fair treatment from the authorities 
is not a stimulant for taxpayers to contribute to pay taxes. 
        Keywords: Vertical Trust, Horizontal Trust, Tax 
Compliance, Tax Authority 
 
I . INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia has adopted self assessment system in the 
implementation of its taxation. Self assessment system is the 
mandate of Article 2 of General Provisions of Taxation (KUP). 
In this system, a taxpayer is given the power and opportunity 
to enroll and obtain a Tax Numbers (NPWP) and is confirmed 
as a Taxable Persons for VAT Purposes (PKP), to calculate the 
tax payable independently, to calculate the taxes that have 
been deducted and levied by other parties, to deposit additional 
taxes payable independently, and to report his tax return (SPT) 
on his own awareness. The taxes paid by the taxpayer shall be 
deemed true until the government can prove it wrong. 
The impact of such a system is that the supervision on tax 
compliance becomes an urgent matter that must be considered 
by the Directorate General of Taxation. This is because the 
taxpayers are given full authority to carry out or not to carry 
out their rights and obligations. This system highly relies on 
the taxpayers’ awareness, so it must be supported by clear, fair 
and transparent rules and simple administrative procedures. In 
fact, tax evasion behavior tends to be part of the self 
assessment system. 
Madeo et. al[1] explain that the process of self-assessment 
system in tax reporting is based on the duty of all taxpayers to 
fill out and report their income on the tax returns properly. In 
line with the implementation of self-assessment, the taxpayers 
are expected to reach the level of voluntary tax compliance. 
Voluntary tax compliance refers to the compliance of the 
taxpayers to report tax on actual conditions. 
In general, people think of tax as a tribute, so it is deemed 
burdensome. They have less confidence in the existence of tax 
and know nothing about what and how tax is. As a result, the 
cost of compliance is high because it requires intensive audits 
and increased sanctions. Although tax revenue has increased 
every year, but Indonesia still faces some problems. First, the 
tax ratio is still relatively low compared to other countries. 
Second, the tax reporting ratio is very low, especially related to 
the ratio between the number of taxpayers who contributes to 
taxes and the number of registered taxpayers. Thirth, the 
realization of the revenue of all kinds of taxes is still below its 
potential. 
Basically, nobody likes to pay taxes. The most popular 
instrument to force people to pay taxes is the implementation 
of prevention policies. According to the theory of neoclassical 
economic standard, strict audit enforcement and fines 
determine the level of tax evasion[2]. Tax compliance will 
increase in accordance with an increase in audits and 
sanctions. However, the increase in compliance is not 
significant[3]. Subsequent research reveals that compliance 
cannot be explained entirely by purely financial 
considerations, but mainly generated by the level of 
enforcement[4].  Tax compliance becomes higher due to 
psychological factors such as: increased understanding of tax 
ethics[5], friendly approach[6], or when a taxpayer receives in 
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return from government in the form of public facilities funded 
from tax payments[7] and other social factors.  
Trust is an important factor that can overcome the crisis 
and the difficulties between the tax authorities and the 
taxpayers. Besides, it is also an important asset in building 
long-term relationships.  
Trust is divided into vertical trust and horizontal trust. 
Vertical trust is the trust of the taxpayer to the tax authorities, 
while horizontal trust is the trust of the taxpayer to other 
taxpayers. The purpose of this study is to find out empirical 
evidence of the effect of trust factor on voluntary tax 
compliance. Voluntary tax compliance is necessary to 
understand because it can reduce the cost of compliance[8]. 
Vertical trust is influenced by the treatment provided by 
the tax authorities to taxpayers. If the procedures of tax 
administration are well communicated to the taxpayers, the 
motivation to comply with the tax will be higher. The tax 
authorities also have to avoid being inferior, for example, by 
treating the taxpayers like "cops and robbers", causing the 
taxpayers to evade taxes[9]. Procedural fairness shows how 
much the public perception on the level of fairness and justice 
of the procedures performed by the authority in decision-
making. The higher the fairness of the procedures used by the 
tax authorities, the more satisfied the taxpayers’ feeling with 
the tax authorities. 
Traditional model has some weaknesses because this 
model treats taxation as an isolated case. Understanding 
taxpayer compliance is necessary to determine the behavior of 
other taxpayers. Pro-social behavior theory, which takes the 
behavior of other people into consideration, may be promising.  
On the other hand, social norms theory states that 
taxpayers are likely to increase their pro-social behavior if 
there is a stimulus. The taxpayers will seek to adjust their 
personal interests with the prevailing social norms. Social 
norms stimulus can be in the form of fairness, cooperation or 
fulfillment of promise. When there is such stimulus, someone 
will take higher pro-social action than when there is no such 
stimulus. This is the following hypotheses: (1) Tax compliance 
will increase when the taxpayers feel that the tax authorities 
treat them fairly. (2) Tax compliance will increase when the 
taxpayers know that other taxpayers also contribute to pay 
taxes. (3) In circumstances where other taxpayers do not 
contribute to pay taxes, the taxpayers who feel that they get 
fair treatment from the tax authorities will fulfill their tax 
obligations. 
 
II. METHOD 
Research Design 
Experiment between subjects in this study is using a 2 x 2 
factorial design. This method involves the manipulation of the 
condition of the subject studied, with strict control over 
external factors, and a comparison subjects to establish a 
causal phenomenon. The experiment used in this research is a 
laboratory experiment which is conducted to complement other 
studies of tax compliance mostly done using secondary data. 
There are two independent variables, in which each variable 
has two levels. The variables being subjected in this 
experiment are trust to the tax authorities and perception of the 
behavior of other taxpayers. The cases contained in this 
experimental design are taken from real cases that often occur 
in the community and have a low-detected probability and thus 
requiring voluntary tax compliance to report it. The process of 
designing manipulation involves psychologists and taxation 
experts through focus group discussion. 
Two short videos, with duration of five minutes each, 
were made for the simulation of the tax compliance. The first 
video is about the high trust to the tax authorities and the 
second video is about the low trust to the tax authorities. The 
treatment of the perception of other taxpayers’ behavior is 
provided in the form of storyboards. At the level of other 
taxpayers who contribute to pay their taxes is given a 
storyboard containing conversations between the taxpayers and 
other taxpayers who always report all their income in the tax 
return. Meanwhile, at the level of other taxpayers who do not 
contribute to pay their taxes is given a storyboard containing 
conversations between the taxpayers and other taxpayers who 
do not report their income received in the tax return. 
Participant 
The researcher invited 80 MSME entrepreneurs to 
participate in a training that was ended with simulation of 
taxes. The participants who had TIN and passed the 
manipulation test were 60 people. 
Procedure 
Participants were divided into four groups. The division of 
the group was associated with the treatment that would be 
received by each participant in accordance with the lottery 
numbers drawn. Randomization was performed by taking 
lottery numbers that divided the participants into two groups. 
Having entered each room, the participants were randomized 
again to the division of the different booklets so that later the 
participants were divided into four groups which were equal to 
the number of cells of this research. 
In this simulation, the participants were asked to 
play as a taxpayer who had a quite advanced restaurant 
business and was given a case. Then he was given a video 
treatment about the low/high trust to the tax authorities. After 
that, the participants were asked to make a decision whether to 
report all or only partially or not report their income in the tax 
return. The second treatment was in the form of a storyboard 
containing conversations between taxpayers and other 
taxpayers who had reported/had not reported all of their 
income. Then, the participants were asked to make a decision 
again whether to report all or only partially or not report their 
income in the tax return depending on their response to each 
treatment received. The scale used was from 0% (not reporting 
all income) to 100% (reporting all income). 
III. RESEARCH FINDINGS & DISCUSSION 
ANOVA test results show that the independent variables 
of trust to the tax authorities and trust to other taxpayers have 
an effect on the percentage of income reported, which means 
that H1 and H2 are accepted. The trust to the tax authorities 
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provides f count value of 90.147 with P value/significance 
value = 0.00 < alpha = 0.05. This indicates that main effects 
are supported; meaning that there is a difference in the 
percentage of income reported between the categories of the 
trust to the tax authorities. The perception of other taxpayers 
contributes to increase awareness of the taxpayers in reporting 
their income taxes than the perception of other taxpayers who 
do not contribute. It can be seen from the f count value of 
28.688 with P value/significance value = 0.00 <alpha = 0.05. 
 
TABLE 1  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Percentage of earnings reported 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected 
Model 
48780.878
a
 3 16260.293 39.616 .000 
Intercept 165902.411 1 165902.411 404.195 .000 
Authority 37000.744 1 37000.744 90.147 .000 
Taxpayer 11775.030 1 11775.030 28.688 .000 
Authority * 
Taxpayer 
90.030 1 90.030 .219 .641 
Error 22985.268 56 410.451   
Total 228081.250 60    
Corrected 
Total 
71766.146 59    
a. R Squared = ,680 (Adjusted R Squared = ,663) 
 
There is no joint effect between the trust to tax authority 
and the trust to other taxpayers on the percentage of income 
reported. It can be seen from the results of interaction where 
the value of f count is 0219 with a P value/significance value = 
0,641> alpha = 0.05, which means that H3 is not supported. 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.663 or 66.3% means the variability of 
the percentage of income reported that can be explained by the 
variable of trust to the tax authorities, the perception of other 
taxpayers and the authority interaction with the taxpayers of 
69.7%. The following is a graph of the interaction between the 
trust to the tax authorities and the perception of other 
taxpayers: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
This study examines the effect of public trust to the tax 
authority and other taxpayers on the decision of voluntary tax 
compliance in a randomized experimental research. Trust has 
three essential components[10]. First, the trust that the 
partners, in the relationship, would show good faith in their 
actions which may affect the relationship carried out directly 
and indirectly. Second, the trust also includes honesty, which 
means that a party entrusts a relationship to a trusted partner. 
Third, there is a dimension which includes the trust in the 
competence. It is the trust that the partner, in the relationship, 
has the ability to act on the basis of the benefits of the 
relationship. Hypothesis 1 predicts that vertical trust has 
positive effect on tax compliance. The test results support the 
prediction. The taxpayers who feel that they are treated 
properly and fairly by the tax officials will have a high 
confidence in the tax authorities. This removes the existing 
stigma that the tax officials always behave arrogantly, 
suspiciously and arbitrarily to the taxpayers like “cops and 
robbers”. The taxpayers feel that they are served by the tax 
authorities who refer to a "psychological contract" and 
respectful relationships that encourage the taxpayers to act 
loyally and pay taxes honestly. This research complements the 
research of De Cremer[11], Van Dijke and Verboon[12], Feld 
and Frey[13], and Kirchler, Hoelzl et al.[14] that the mutual 
trust between the tax authorities and the taxpayers leads to a 
synergistic climate. In the synergistic climate, the tax 
authorities believe that the people pay their taxes honestly, so 
that the tax authorities treat them politely and respectfully. In 
the end the taxpayers believe that the government and tax 
authorities provide good service to them so that the taxpayers 
meet their tax obligations obediently and truly. The level of 
procedural fairness is an important resource for the public in 
evaluating the level of the moral of the tax authorities. The 
research conducted by Frey and Torgler[15] shows consistent 
findings that the public perceives the authority that gives unfair 
procedures of sanction as the authority that has no legitimacy. 
The perception of unfair procedure can lead to the decreased 
trust in the authority. When the tax authorities make fair 
procedure, the public will tend to adhere to the decision of the 
authorities.  
One of the strategic objectives of the Directorate General 
of Taxation (DJP) is to increase the satisfaction of taxpayers 
and stakeholders taxation in order to realize a high level of 
public confidence in the tax service. This is in line with the 
mandate of Law Number 25 of 2009 on Public Service. For 
that DJP issued a Guide Service Excellence Directorate 
General of Taxation. The guide is expected to be a reference 
for all employees of the DJP in the act and behave in providing 
good service to the taxpayer. In fact, there are employees who 
do not follow the guidelines DJP Service Excellence issued. 
For that need to be considered fundamental rules of procedural 
fairness, namely: 
a. Consistency. Fair procedures should be consistently better 
than the one to the other or from time to time. Everyone has 
equal rights and are treated in the same procedure. 
b. Minimization of Bias. There are two sources of bias  that 
often arises, namely individual interest and doctrine pro. 
Therefore, in an effort to minimize this bias, both individual 
interests and partiality must be avoided. 
c. Accurate information. The information required to 
determine that justice must be an accurate assessment is to be 
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based on facts. If the opinion as a basis, it must be delivered by 
people who really know the problem, and the information 
presented must be complete. 
d. Irreparable. Efforts to fix the error is one of the important 
objectives of justice should be upheld. Therefore, a fair 
procedure also contains rules which aim to correct errors or 
errors that may appear. 
e. Representative. The procedure is said to be fair since the 
beginning of efforts to involve all parties concerned. 
f. Ethical. Fair procedures should be based on ethical and 
moral standards. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that horizontal trust has positive 
effect on voluntary tax compliance. The test results of 
empirical data support this hypothesis. These findings support 
the theory of reciprocity[16]. Adapted to the context of tax 
compliance, horizontal reciprocal means that if many people 
pay taxes, other taxpayers will also feel obligated to contribute 
and pay taxes. The individuals want their behavior in 
accordance with normal behavior. Conformity is someone who 
is willing to contribute to a public good that does not benefit 
anyone directly, as long as he observes that others contribute 
sufficiently[17]. Taxpayers are willing to pay their taxes with 
the requirements depending on the pro-social behavior of other 
taxpayers. Therefore, when a taxpayer considers that there are 
more other taxpayers who are honest in paying their taxes, he 
is also more willing to pay his own taxes. Henrich[18] 
provides an overview of other promising concept, that is, 
conformity. Conformity means that the motivation to behave in 
a conditional cooperation can be influenced by the desire of 
the taxpayer to meet the social norm to pay taxes and behave 
according to the rules of society.  
Hypothesis 3 states that in a circumstancein which other 
taxpayers do not contribute to pay taxes, the taxpayers who 
feel that they have got fair treatment from the tax authorities 
will fulfill their tax obligations. This hypothesis is not 
supported by empirical data, which means that this study does 
not provide evidence that the fair treatment obtained from the 
authorities can be a stimulant for the taxpayers to contribute to 
pay taxes even though other taxpayers do not contribute. There 
are several things that can be used as an explanation. First, 
there has been no shame culture for not paying taxes in 
Indonesia. The theory of social norms for tax compliance does 
not apply in Indonesia. Social norms are common habits that 
become the standard of behavior in a society and the 
limitations of certain regions. Norms will develop in line with 
the social agreements of the community, or commonly called 
as social rules. Taxpayers in Indonesia do not feel ashamed 
when they do not pay taxes. A gubernatorial candidate, who 
formerly worked as a large entrepreneur and has master 
degree, proudly says that he has succeeded the government 
programs by following tax amnesty and invites other people to 
follow in his foot steps. This is done merely to attract public 
sympathy. Logically, tax amnesty program is a government 
remission granted to taxpayers who do not report all income 
earned in previous years. So, it is natural for the taxpayers who 
are just starting a business because they do not know or have 
not been able to pay the tax consultant. But for the owners of 
large companies, they usually hire employees who understand 
taxation and ensure the correctness of the tax return report 
using the services of a tax consultant. Therefore, there is no 
reason for large entrepreneurs to say that they do not know if 
there are tax, income and property that have not been reported. 
Second, there is lack of tax socialization and education in 
schools. Self assessment system adopted by Indonesia assumes 
that the taxpayers have already had sufficient knowledge of 
taxation. A taxpayer of Bachelor graduate majoring in 
architectural engineering never gets tax education in school. 
When he starts his business, he, as the taxpayer, must actively 
seek out by himself. So, it is natural if the taxpayer still has a 
lack of awareness in paying taxes. Tax education is highly 
required so that the people know the benefits and functions of 
taxes earlier. In addition, the people also need to know the 
different types of taxes and who performs tax collection. 
Finally, factor of fairness among taxpayers is very influential. 
For a taxpayer who dutifully pays taxes and fulfills all of his 
business licensing requirements, tax and business licenses are 
burdensome. Tax and license fees will affect the businessmen 
in determining the selling price compared to other 
businessmen who do not pay taxes and run illegal businesses. 
The selling price determined by the businessmen who obey to 
pay taxes cannot compete with the price selling price 
determined by those who do not obey to pay taxes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This study of tax compliance divides the trust into two 
types: vertical trust and horizontal trust. The results of this 
study explain that trust is an important factor in voluntary tax 
compliance. The trust to the tax authorities is very influential 
in stimulating tax compliance among citizens. Previous 
research states that applying fair procedures can improve the 
trust to what is established by the authorities. 
The research findings also strengthen the theory of     
conformity where taxpayers will contribute more if other 
taxpayers also pay taxes. In other words, if many people evade 
taxes, a taxpayer will not feel obliged to pay taxes. Conformity 
means that the motivation to behave in a conditional 
cooperation can be influenced by the desire of the taxpayer to 
meet the social norm, that is, to pay taxes and behave 
according to the rules of society. 
Based on primary data, there is no interaction between 
vertical trust and horizontal trust. Taxpayers in Indonesia give 
more attention to the behavior of other taxpayers and the lack 
of services provided by the tax authorities. This phenomenon 
occurs because there is has been no social sanction for those 
who commit tax evasionin society and lack of knowledge of 
taxation. To overcome this problem, the government should 
promote tax socialization/tax education ranging from basic 
education. 
This study explores the effect of vertical and horizontal 
trust on voluntary tax compliance with participants of MSMEs 
taxpayersonly. Therefore, there are still large opportunities for 
further studies to conduct in-depth exploration. The next 
studies may test the effect of authority trust, authority power 
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and horizontal trust partially or simultaneously on tax 
compliance by using different cases of material. 
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